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Abstract—Rowhammer is a hardware bug that can be ex-
ploited to implement privilege escalation and remote code execu-
tion attacks. Previous proposals on rowhammer mitigation either
require hardware changes or follow heuristic-based approaches
(based on CPU performance counters). To date, there exists no
instant protection against rowhammer attacks on legacy systems.
In this paper, we present the design and implementation
of two practical and efficient software-only defenses against
rowhammer attacks. Our defenses prevent the attacker from
leveraging rowhammer to corrupt physically co-located data
in memory that is owned by a different system entity. Our
first defense, B-CATT, extends the system bootloader to disable
vulnerable physical memory. B-CATT is highly practical, does not
require changes to the operating system, and can be deployed on
virtually all x86-based systems. While B-CATT is able to stop all
known rowhammer attacks, it does not yet tackle the fundamental
problem of missing memory isolation in physical memory. To
address this problem, we introduce our second defense G-CATT,
a generic solution that extends the physical memory allocator
of the OS to physically isolate the memory of different system
entities (e.g., kernel and user space).
As proof of concept, we implemented B-CATT on x86,
and our generic defense, G-CATT, on x86 and ARM to miti-
gate rowhammer-based kernel exploits. Our extensive evaluation
shows that both mitigation schemes (i) can stop available real-
world rowhammer attacks, (ii) impose virtually no run-time
overhead for common user and kernel benchmarks as well as
commonly used applications, and (iii) do not affect the stability
of the overall system.
I. INTRODUCTION
CPU-enforced memory protection is fundamental to mod-
ern computer security: for each memory access request, the
CPU verifies whether this request meets the memory access
policy. However, the infamous rowhammer attack [12] under-
mines this access control model by exploiting a hardware fault
(triggered through software) to flip targeted bits in memory.
The cause for this hardware fault is due to the tremendous
density increase of memory cells in modern DRAM chips,
allowing electrical charge of one memory cell to affect that
of an adjacent memory cell. Unfortunately, increased refresh
rates of DRAM modules – as suggested by some hardware
manufacturers – cannot eliminate this effect [3]. In fact, the
fault appeared as a surprise to hardware manufacturers, simply
because it does not appear during normal system operation.
Rowhammer attacks repetitively read (hammer) from the same
physical memory address in very short time intervals which
eventually leads to a bit flip in a physically co-located memory
cell.
Rowhammer Attack Diversity. Although it might seem that
single bit flips are not per-se dangerous, recent attacks demon-
strate that rowhammer can be used to undermine access control
policies and manipulate data in various ways. In particular, it
allows for tampering with the isolation between user and kernel
mode [21]. For this, a malicious user-mode application locates
vulnerable memory cells and forces the operating system to
fill the physical memory with page-table entries (PTEs), i.e.,
entries that define access policies to memory pages. Manip-
ulating one PTE by means of a bit flip allows the malicious
application to alter memory access policies, building a custom
page table hierarchy, and finally assigning kernel permissions
to a user-mode memory page. Rowhammer attacks have made
use of specific CPU instructions to force DRAM access and
avoid cache effects. However, prohibiting applications from
executing these instructions, as suggested in [21], is ineffective
because recent rowhammer attacks do no longer depend on
special instructions [3]. As such, rowhammer has become a
versatile attack technique allowing compromise of co-located
virtual machines [19, 27], and enabling sophisticated control-
flow hijacking attacks [5, 20, 23] without requiring memory
corruption bugs [4, 7, 21]. Lastly, a recent attack, called
Drammer [24], demonstrates that rowhammer is not limited to
x86-based systems but also applies to mobile devices running
ARM processors.
Rowhammer Mitigation. The common belief is that the
rowhammer fault cannot be fixed by means of any software
update, but requires production and deployment of redesigned
DRAM modules. Hence, existing legacy systems will remain
vulnerable for many years, if not forever. An initial defense
approach performed through a BIOS update was unsuccess-
ful as it only slightly increased the difficulty to conduct
the attack [21]. The only other software-based mitigation of
rowhammer, we are aware of, is a heuristic-based approach
that relies on hardware performance counters [3]. However, it
induces a worst-case overhead of 8% and suffers from false
positives which impedes its deployment in practice.
Goals and Contributions. The goal of this paper is to
develop the first practical and generic software-based defenses
against rowhammer attacks that can instantly protect existing
vulnerable legacy systems without suffering from any per-
formance overhead and false positives. Intuitively, a defense
against rowhammer needs to prevent the dangerous bit flips
by disabling vulnerable memory pages. Kim et al. [12] were
first discussing this idea, however, they conclude that this
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mitigation will generate very high overhead and significantly
reduce the amount of available memory. To validate this
defense approach, we developed our first mitigation scheme,
called B-CATT,1 that systematically scans the memory to iden-
tify and blacklist vulnerable memory pages. We implemented
B-CATT as a bootloader extension to support and protect a
wide range of operating systems. In contrast, to the conclusion
drawn in [12], we show that B-CATT is highly efficient and
prevents all existing rowhammer attacks. On the other hand,
it is not yet known whether memory vulnerable to bit flips
changes over time or under different experiment conditions
(e.g., temperature, methodology to identify bit flips). This
motivated us to develop a second and more generic mitigation
scheme, called G-CATT,2 that does not aim to prevent bit
flips but rather remove the dangerous effects (i.e., exploitation)
of bit flips. This is achieved by limiting bit flips to memory
pages that are already in the address space of the malicious
application, i.e., memory pages that are per-se untrusted. For
this, we extend the operating system kernel to enforce a strong
physical isolation of different system entities, e.g., user and
kernel space.
To summarize, our main contributions are:
• We present practical software-based defenses against
rowhammer. In contrast to existing solutions, our
defenses require no hardware changes [12], do not
deploy unreliable heuristics [3], and still allow legacy
applications to execute instructions that are believed
to alleviate rowhammer attacks [21].
• We systematically revisit the practicality and effective-
ness of an intuitive mitigation approach that proposes
marking memory, vulnerable to rowhammer, unavail-
able to the system. We also developed a prototype,
B-CATT, which implements this approach for the first
time.
• We propose a generic enforcement mechanism for op-
erating system kernels, G-CATT, to mitigate rowham-
mer attacks. Our design ensures that the attacker can
only flip bits in memory that is already under her
control.
• We present two prototype implementations, one for
the Linux kernel version 4.6 and one for the GRUB
bootloader, and demonstrate their effectiveness in mit-
igating all previously presented rowhammer attacks [7,
21].
• We successfully applied our Linux kernel patch for
G-CATT to the Android version 4.4 for Google’s
Nexus devices. This allows us to also mitigate Dram-
mer [24], a recent rowhammer-based privilege escala-
tion exploit on ARM.
• We extensively evaluate the performance, robust-
ness and security of our defense approaches against
rowhammer attacks to demonstrate the effectiveness
and high practicality of both B-CATT and G-CATT. In
particular, our performance measurements indicate no
1The name B-CATT is composed of two parts: B refers to our Bootloader
based solution, CATT abbreviates CAn’t Touch This.
2G-CATT is short for Generic CATT.
Figure 1: Organization of a DRAM module.
computational overhead for common user and kernel
benchmarks.
Note that recent research demonstrates a variety of ex-
ploitation strategies that rely on rowhammer [4, 19, 27]. While
these attacks show the versatility of rowhammer, they are
not always practical. For example, attacking the browser with
rowhammer can take up to 45 minutes [4], and attacking a
virtual machine may require a couple of days of preparation
time [19]. Hence, our proof-of-concept implementation of
G-CATT aims to mitigate practical rowhammer attacks that
escalate the privileges to the superuser root by manipulating
the kernel page tables [21, 24]. We discuss further deployment
cases in Section VIII-B.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we provide the basic background knowledge
necessary for understanding the remainder of this paper.
A. Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)
A DRAM module, as shown in Figure 1, is structured hier-
archically. The hardware module is called Dual Inline Memory
Module (DIMM), which is physically connected through a
channel to the memory controller. Modern desktop systems
usually feature two channels facilitating parallel accesses to
memory. The DIMM can be divided into one or two ranks
corresponding to its front- and backside. Each rank contains
multiple banks which are the chips that contain the memory
cells. Each bank is organized in columns and rows, as shown
in Figure 2.
An individual memory cell consists of a capacitor and a
transistor. To store a bit in a memory cell, the capacitor is
electrically charged. By reading a bit from a memory cell,
the cell is discharged, i.e., read operations are destructive. To
prevent information loss, read operations also trigger a process
that writes the bit back to the cell. A read operation always
reads out the bits from a whole row, and the result is first saved
in the row buffer before it is then transferred to the memory
controller. The row buffer is also used to write back the content
into the row of memory cells to restore their content.
It is noteworthy to mention that there exists a non-linear
mapping between physical memory address and the rank-bank-
row on the hardware module. Consequently, two consecutive
physical memory addresses can be mapped to memory cells
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Figure 2: Organization of a Bank.
that are located on different ranks, banks, or rows. For ex-
ample, on Intel Ivy Bridge CPUs the 20th bit of the physical
address determines the rank. As such, the consecutive physical
addresses 0x2FFFFF and 0x300000 can be located on front and
back side of the DIMM for this architecture. The knowledge
of the physical memory location on the DIMM is important
for both rowhammer attacks and defenses, since bit flips can
only occur on the same bank. For Intel processors, the exact
mapping is not officially documented, but has been reverse
engineered [16, 27].
B. Rowhammer Overview and Challenges
As mentioned before, memory access control is an essential
building block of modern computer security, e.g., to achieve
process isolation, isolation of kernel code, and manage read-
write-execute permission on memory pages. Modern systems
feature a variety of mechanisms to isolate memory, e.g.,
paging [11], virtualization [1, 10], IOMMU [2], and special
execution modes like SGX [11] and SMM [11]. However,
these mechanisms enforce their isolation through hardware
that mediates the physical memory accesses (in most cases
the CPU). Hence, memory assigned to isolated entities can
potentially be co-located in physical memory on the same
bank. Since a rowhammer attack induces bit flips in co-located
memory cells, it provides a subtle way to launch a remote
attack to undermine memory isolation.
Recently, various rowhammer-based attacks have been pre-
sented. Specifically, rowhammer was utilized to undermine
isolation of operating system and hypervisor code, and escape
from application sandboxes leveraged in web browsers. In
the following, we describe the challenges and workflow of
rowhammer attacks. A more elaborated discussion on real-
world, rowhammer-based exploits will be provided in Sec-
tion IX.
The rowhammer fault allows an attacker to influence the
electrical charge of individual memory cells by activating
neighboring memory cells. In particular, Kim et al. [12]
demonstrate that repeatedly activating two rows separated by
only one row, called aggressor rows ( 1 and 3 in Figure 2),
lead to a bit flip in the enclosed row 2 , called victim row. To
do so, the attacker has to overcome the following challenges:
(i) undermine memory caches to directly perform repetitive
reads on physical DRAM memory, and (ii) gain access to
memory co-located to data critical to memory isolation.
Overcoming challenge (i) is complicated because modern
CPUs feature different levels of memory caches which me-
diate read and write access to physical memory. Caches are
important as processors are orders of magnitude faster than
current DRAM hardware, turning memory accesses into a bot-
tleneck for applications [25]. Usually, caches are transparent to
software, but many systems feature special instructions, e.g.,
clflush or movnti for x86 [18, 21], to undermine the
cache. Further, caches can be undermined by using certain
read-access patterns that force the cache to reload data from
physical memory. Such patterns exist, because CPU caches
are much smaller than physical memory, and system engineers
have to adopt an eviction strategy to effectively utilize caches.
Through alternating accesses to addresses which reside in the
same cache line, the attacker can force the memory contents
to be fetched from physical memory.
The attacker’s second challenge (ii) is to achieve the
physical memory constellation shown in Figure 2. The attacker
needs access to the aggressor rows in order to be able to
activate (hammer) them (rows 1 and 3 in Figure 2). Addi-
tionally, the victim row must contain data which is attackable
by a bit flip ( 2 in Figure 2). Both conditions cannot be
enforced by the attacker, however, he can achieve them with
high probability through the following approaches. First, the
attacker allocates memory hoping that the aggressor rows are
contained in the allocated memory. If the operating system
maps the attacker’s allocated memory to the physical memory
containing the aggressor rows the attacker has achieved the
first condition. Since the attacker has no influence on the
mapping between virtual memory and physical memory he
cannot directly influence this step, but he can increase the
probability by allocating large amounts of memory; also, the
attacker can repeat this step until he succeeds. Once the
attacker has the aggressor rows under his control he releases
all allocated memory except the parts containing the aggressor
rows. Next, the attacker needs the data he wants to manipulate
to be stored in the victim row. Again, he cannot directly
influence which data is stored in the physical memory and
needs to resort to a probabilistic approach. The attacker induces
the creation of many copies of the victim data with the goal
that one copy of the victim data will be placed in the victim
row. The attacker cannot directly verify whether the second
step was successful, he has to execute the rowhammer attack
and check if the attack is successful, otherwise he has to repeat
the second step.
In [21], the authors successfully implemented this approach
to compromise the kernel from an unprivileged user process.
They gain control over the aggressor rows and then make the
OS create huge amounts of page table entries with the goal of
placing one page table entry in the victim row. By flipping a
bit in a page table entry the authors gain control over a subtree
of the page tables allowing them to manipulate memory access
control policies.
III. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Our threat model is in line with related work [4, 7,
18, 19, 21, 27]: rowhammer-based attacks assume that the
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adversary is capable of executing malicious code in an isolated
environment. Depending on the attack scenario, the isolated
environment can be a JavaScript to launch browser-based
attacks, a malicious user-mode application to construct kernel
exploits, or an entire operating system for running attacks
against co-located virtual machines in a cloud setting. The
goal of an adversary is to undermine the isolation. In other
words, the attacker aims to break out of the established trust
boundary by inducing bit flips in memory that does not belong
to the isolated environment. Ultimately, an adversary gains a
higher privilege level than originally assigned to the isolated
environment.
Our threat model differentiates between reliable and unre-
liable bit flips. The former can be reproduced, e.g., across
multiple reboots, the latter cannot be produced on every
attempt to flip a bit through rowhammer. Note that all available
rowhammer-based attacks depend on reliable bit flips. How-
ever, in this paper, we consider software-defenses against both
types of bit flips.
IV. OVERVIEW AND DESIGN
In this section, we present the high-level idea and design
of our practical software-based defenses against rowhammer
attacks. Our first defense, dubbed B-CATT, mitigates malicious
bit flips by marking memory vulnerable to rowhammer as
unavailable at boot-time. In contrast, our second defense,
called G-CATT, tackles the malicious effect of rowhammer-
induced bit flips by instrumenting the operating system’s
memory allocator to constrain bit flips to the boundary where
the attacker’s malicious code executes (cf. Section III). Both
solutions B-CATT and G-CATT are completely transparent to
applications, and do not require any hardware changes. We
provide a detailed description of our implementation of both
solutions in Section V-A.
A. Boot-CATT
Prior to launching a rowhammer attack, the attacker needs
to probe the memory to locate vulnerable memory. Hence, a
software-only defense needs to identify the vulnerable memory
parts and mark them as unavailable. While simple in theory, it
was commonly believed that this defense strategy is inefficient
and significantly reduces the amount of available memory [12].
To validate this, we developed B-CATT, a new bootloader ex-
tension that locates and disables vulnerable memory parts (see
Figure 3a). Implementing this defense strategy is challenging
without inducing performance penalties. While we investigated
different implementation strategies, we opted for a bootloader
extension in order to protect a wide range of operating systems.
That is, our bootloader-based approach does not require any
changes to the operating system and is fully compatible with
legacy systems.
In general, all bootloaders commit a list of available
memory to the operating system ( 3 ). This list is dynamically
obtained during boot time using the system’s firmware (e.g.,
BIOS/UEFI). It is common that certain physical memory
addresses cannot be used by the operating system, e.g., the
memory reserved for hardware devices such as graphics or
network cards. B-CATT extends the bootloader and hooks into
this process. Specifically, it adds the physical addresses of
vulnerable memory to the list of unavailable memory ( 2 ).
To locate vulnerable addresses, we re-use techniques from
existing rowhammer exploitation tools [6, 7] and slightly
adjust them for the purpose of our approach. Note that this
analysis is performed offline prior the system is protected with
B-CATT ( 1 ). From the operating system’s perspective, the
vulnerable physical memory simply becomes unavailable ( 4 ).
Since handling unavailable memory regions is a core function-
ality of operating systems, B-CATT adheres to common system
functionality.
B. Generic-CATT
Note that B-CATT takes a snapshot of vulnerable memory
addresses. Since there is no security guarantee that vulnerable
memory changes over time or other memory addresses get
vulnerable under different test conditions, we developed a
second prototype that provides long-term protection against
rowhammer attacks. Our second defense, called G-CATT,
follows a different and more generic defense strategy: it
tolerates rowhammer-induced bit flips, but prevents bit flips
from affecting memory belonging to higher-privileged security
domains, e.g., the operating system kernel or co-located virtual
machines. As discussed in Section II-B, a rowhammer attack
requires the adversary to bypass the CPU cache. Further, the
attacker must arrange the physical memory layout such that the
targeted data is stored in a row that is physically adjacent to
rows that are under the control of the attacker. Hence, G-CATT
ensures that memory between these two entities is physically
separated by at least one row.3
To do so, G-CATT extends the physical memory alloca-
tor to partition the physical memory into security domains.
G-CATT supports a wide range of memory partitioning levels,
i.e., the granularity of security domains can be tuned from
coarse-grained levels such as the separation between user
and kernel memory to fine-grained memory partition within
a single process.
Figure 3b illustrates the concept. Without G-CATT the
attacker is able to craft a memory layout, where two aggressor
rows enclose a victim row of a higher-privileged domain such
as row 2 in Figure 2. With G-CATT in place, the rows
which are controlled by the attacker are grouped into the
security domain A, whereas memory belonging to higher-
privileged entities resides with their own security domain (e.g.,
the security domain B). Both domains are physically separated
by at least one row which will not be assigned to any security
domain.
Security Domains. The definition of security domains is
critical to ensure the effectiveness of G-CATT. Judging from
previous privilege escalation attacks, good candidates for such
domains are kernel and user-mode, virtual machines, as well
as plugins and scripts in web browsers. Privilege escalation
attacks are popular and pose a severe threat to modern systems.
In particular, the isolation of kernel and user-mode is critical
and the most appealing attack target. If a user-space application
3Kim et al. [12] mention that the rowhammer fault does not only affect
memory cells of directly adjacent rows, but also memory cells of rows that
are next to the adjacent row. Although we did not encounter such cases in
our experiments, G-CATT supports multiple row separation between adversary
and victim data memory.
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Figure 3: Overview of our software-based defenses against rowhammer attacks.
gains kernel privileges, the adversary can typically compromise
the entire system. Due to the importance of these attacks and
the fact that rowhammer-based exploits on kernels are highly
practical, we focus our proof-of-concept implementation on
kernel and user-space isolation. That is, we define and maintain
two security domains: a security domain for kernel memory
allocations, and one security domain for user-mode memory
allocations (see also Figure 3b). Note that G-CATT can be
extended to support further security domains. For instance,
in virtualized environments, virtual machines as well as the
hypervisor can be treated as individual security domains. To
prevent rowhammer attacks crossing the isolation boundaries
of processes in user-mode, G-CATT would need to assign se-
curity domains at the granularity of processes. However, many
security domains associated with many memory allocations
and deallocations will eventually lead to inefficient usage of
memory, i.e., memory fragmentation. If memory fragmentation
is an issue, G-CATT could resort in only assigning a dedicated
security domain for untrusted third-party processes. For in-
process isolation, e.g., to prevent rowhammer-based sandbox-
ing escapes in browsers [4], G-CATT needs to distinguish the
allocations of trusted browser code and untrusted sandboxed
code. Although we have not yet implemented security domains
beyond kernel and user-mode, we believe that there no major
conceptual obstacles in supporting security domains for each
of the described scenarios.
Challenges. The physical isolation of data raises the challenge
of how to effectively isolate the memory of different system
entities. To tackle this challenge, we first require knowledge of
the mapping between physical addresses and memory banks.
Since an attacker can only corrupt data within one bank, but not
across banks, G-CATT only has to ensure that security domains
of different system entities are isolated within each bank.
However, as mentioned in Section II-A, hardware vendors do
not specify the exact mapping between physical address and
banks. Fortunately, Pessl et al. [16] and Xiao et al. [27] provide
a methodology to reverse engineer the mapping. For G-CATT,
we use this methodology to discover the physical addresses of
rows.
Lastly, we need to ensure that the physical memory man-
agement component is aware of the isolation policy. This is vi-
tal as the memory management components have to ensure that
newly allocated memory is adjacent only to memory belonging
to the same security domain. To tackle this challenge, we
instrumented the memory allocator to keep track of the domain
association of physical memory and serve memory requests by
selecting free memory from different pools depending on the
security domain of the requested memory.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
Both of our software-based defenses are based on modifica-
tions to low-level system software components, i.e., the boot-
loader (B-CATT) and the operating system kernel (G-CATT).
We chose GRUB2 and Linux 4.6 as targets for our proof-
of-concept implementations for two reasons: (1) their source
code is freely available, and (2) both projects are widely used.
First, we briefly describe how B-CATT blacklists rowhammer-
affected pages. Thereafter, we explain the implementation
of G-CATT’s policy enforcement mechanism in the Linux
kernel which allows for the partitioning of physical memory
into isolated security domains. Note that our prototype im-
plementation of B-CATT targets x86-based systems, whereas
G-CATT targets both x86 and ARM-based systems. Until
today, rowhammer attacks have been only demonstrated for
these two prominent architectures. Furthermore, as mentioned
before, our prototype implementations target rowhammer ex-
ploits that aim at violating the isolation between kernel and
user-mode since these are the most prominent and practical
types of rowhammer exploits.
A. B-CATT
To mitigate the exploitation of the rowhammer hardware
bug in legacy systems, B-CATT features a blacklisting mech-
anism to prevent the operating system from using vulnerable
pages. Recall that Kim et al. [12] concluded that blacklisting is
not practical if the majority of rows are susceptible to rowham-
mer. However, our evaluation (Section VI-A2) suggests that
only a fraction of rows are vulnerable in practice. This is
also in line with previous work [21]. In fact, we noticed that
blacklisting vulnerable memory is highly practical as it only
requires a small extension to the bootloader (64 lines of code).
We exploit the fact that operating systems already feature a
function that allows blacklisting certain physical memory ad-
dresses. Specifically, x86 compatible operating systems detect
usable memory through the so-called e820 map [9]. This
map contains a list of usable physical memory. It can be
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Figure 4: Workflow of B-CATT
obtained from the BIOS through the interrupt number 0xe820.
On modern systems, this map is not directly requested by
the operating system. In contrast, the bootloader forwards the
map to the operating system. To prevent rowhammer attacks,
B-CATT instruments the GRUB2 bootloader to add physical
addresses of vulnerable memory to the e820 map. Note
that the original e820 specification only supports 128 entries.
However, the EFI Platform Initialization specification – which
is also supported by GRUB2 – does not limit the number of
entries [28]. In fact, GRUB2 first allocates a buffer to store
both the original e820 map and additional entries. Once it has
stored the original e820 entries into this buffer, it passes a
pointer to this buffer to the operating system. Our B-CATT
patch increases the size of the allocated buffer to additionally
fit the entries for the blacklisted pages.
Figure 4 depicts the detailed workflow of B-CATT. After
upgrading the existing GRUB2 installation, the vulnerable
memory rows are identified with the help of publicly available
tools during an offline analysis [6, 7, 21]. These programs
scan the memory of the machine for vulnerable pages by
allocating large amounts of memory and trying to produce
bit flips. We made some modifications, which we describe in
detail in Section VI-A.
Further, these rows are included as an environment variable
in the boot configuration file of GRUB2 (Step 1 ). Next,
the BIOS starts GRUB2 which then requests the e820 map
(Step 2 – 4 ). Before GRUB2 starts the operating system, it
reads out the environment variable and extends the e820
map (Step 5 – 6 ). Henceforth, the Linux kernel will not use
the vulnerable memory thereby preventing the attacker from
leveraging rowhammer-based attacks.
B. G-CATT
In our proof-of-concept implementation of G-CATT, we
focus on hardening Linux against rowhammer-based attacks
since its memory allocator is open-source. We successfully
applied the described changes to the x86-kernel version 4.6
and the Android kernel for Nexus devices in version 4.4.
The basic idea underlying our generic software-based
rowhammer defense is to physically separate rows that belong
to different security domains. Operating systems are not per-se
aware of the notions of cells and rows, but rather build memory
management based on paging. Commodity operating systems
use paging to map virtual addresses to physical addresses. The
size of a page varies among architectures. On x86 and ARM,
the page size is typically 4096 bytes (4K). As we described
in Section II-A, DRAM hardware consists of much smaller
units of memory, i.e., individual memory cells storing single
bits. Eight consecutive memory cells represent a byte, 4096
consecutive bytes a page frame, two to four page frames a
row. Hence, our implementation of G-CATT changes low-level
components of the kernel to make the operating system aware
of the concept of memory rows.
In the following, we describe how we map individual
memory pages to domains, keep track of different domains,
modify the physical memory allocator, and define partitioning
policies for the system’s DRAM hardware.
1) Mapping Page Frames to Domains: To be able to decide
whether two pages belong to the same security domain we
need to keep track of the security domain for each page frame.
Fortunately, the kernel already maintains meta data about each
individual page frame. More specifically, each individual page
frame is associated with exactly one meta data object (struct
page). The kernel keeps a large array of these objects in
memory. Although these objects describe physical pages, this
array is referred to as virtual memory map, or vmemmap. The
Page Frame Number (PFN) of a physical page is used as an
offset into this array to determine the corresponding struct
page object. To be able to associate a page frame with a
security domain, we extend the definition of struct page
to include a field that encodes the security domain. Since our
prototype implementation targets rowhammer attacks that aim
at violating the separation of kernel and user-space, we encode
security domain 0 for kernel-space, and 1 for user-space. For
preventing rowhammer attacks crossing the process boundary,
G-CATT could exploit the process identification number (PID)
to distinguish security domains. As such, each process will be
treated as a separate security domain, and the kernel will be
associated with its own security domain.
2) Tracking Security Domains: The extension of the page
frame meta data objects enables us to assign pages to security
domains. However, this assignment is dynamic and changes
over time. In particular, a page frame may be requested,
allocated, and used by one domain, after it has been freed by
another domain. Note that this does not violate our security
guarantees, but is necessary for the system to manage phys-
ical memory dynamically. Yet, we need to ensure that page
frames being reallocated continue to obey our security policy.
Therefore, we reset the security domain upon freeing a page.
Upon memory allocation, G-CATT needs to correctly set
the security domain of the new page. To do so, we require
information about the requesting domain. For our case, where
we aim at separating kernel and user-space domains, G-CATT
utilizes the call site information, which is propagated to the
memory allocator by default. Specifically, each allocation
request passes a range of flags to the page allocator. These
flags encode whether an allocation is intended for the kernel
or the user-space. We leverage this information and separate
the two domains by setting the domain field of the respective
page frame.
When processes request memory, the kernel initially only
creates a virtual mapping without providing actual physical
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page frames for the process. Instead, it only assigns physical
memory on demand, i.e., when the requesting process accesses
the virtual mapping a page fault is triggered. Thereafter, the
kernel invokes the physical page allocator to search for usable
pages and installs them under the virtual address the process
attempted to access. We modified the page fault handler, which
initiates the allocation of a new page, to pass information about
the security domain to the page allocator. Next, the page is
allocated according to our policy and sets the domain field of
the page frame’s meta data object to the security domain of
the interrupted process.
3) Modifying the Physical Page Allocator: The Linux
kernel uses different levels of abstraction for different memory
allocation tasks. The physical page allocator, or zoned buddy
allocator is the main low-level facility handling physical page
allocations. It exports its interfaces through functions such as
alloc_pages, which can be used by other kernel compo-
nents to request physical pages. In contrast to higher-level
allocators, the buddy allocator only allows for allocating sets of
memory pages with a cardinality which can be expressed as a
power of two (this is referred to as the order of the allocation).
Hence, the buddy allocator’s smallest level of granularity is a
single memory page. We modify the implementation of the
physical page allocator in the kernel to include a mechanism
for separating and isolating allocated pages according to the
security domain of the origin of the allocation request. In
particular, the page allocator already performs maintenance
checks on free pages. We extend these maintenance checks
to add our partitioning policy before the allocator returns a
physical page. If this check fails, the page allocator is not
allowed to return the page in question, but has to continue its
search for another free page.
4) Defining DRAM Partitioning Policies: Separating and
isolating different security domains is essential to our proposed
mitigation. For this reason, we incorporate detailed knowledge
about the platform and its DRAM hardware configuration into
our policy implementation. While our policy implementation
for a target system largely depends on its architecture and
memory configuration, this does not represent a fundamental
limitation. Indeed, independent research [16, 27] has provided
the architectural details for the most prevalent architectures,
i.e., it shows that the physical address to DRAM mapping
can be reverse engineered automatically for undocumented
architectures. Hence, it is possible to develop similar policy
implementations for architectures and memory configurations
beyond x86 and ARM. We build on this prior research and
leverage the physical address to DRAM mapping informa-
tion to enforce strict physical isolation. In the following,
we describe our implementation of the partitioning strategy
for isolating kernel and user-space, as well as providing an
implementation strategy for isolating individual user processes.
Kernel-User Isolation. To achieve physical separation of user
and kernel space we adopt the following strategy: we divide
each bank into a top and a bottom part, with a separating
row in-between. Page frames for one domain are exclusively
allocated from the part that was assigned to that domain. The
part belonging to the kernel domain is determined by the
physical location of the kernel image.4 As a result, user and
kernel space allocations may be co-located within one bank,
but never within adjacent rows. Different partitioning policies
would be possible in theory: for instance, we could confine
the kernel to a certain DRAM bank to avoid co-location of
user domains within a single bank. However, this would likely
result in a severe increase of memory latency, since reads and
writes to a specific memory bank are served by the bank’s row
buffer. The benefit of our partitioning policy stems from the
fact that we distribute memory belonging to the kernel security
domain over multiple banks thereby not negatively impacting
performance. For our solution towards kernel isolation, we
only need to calculate the row index of a page frame. More
specifically, we calculate this index from the physical address
(PA) in the following way:
Row(PA) :=
PA
PageSize · PagesPerDIMM ·DIMMs
Here, we calculate the number of pages per DIMM as
PagesPerDIMM := PagesPerRow · BanksPerRank ·
RanksPerDIMM . Because all possible row indices are
present once per bank, this equation determines the row index
of the given physical address.5 We note, that this computation
is in line with the available rowhammer exploits [21] and
the reported physical to DRAM mapping recently reverse
engineered [16, 27]. Since the row size is the same for all
Intel architectures prior to Skylake [7], our implementation
for this policy is applicable to a wide range of system setups,
and can be adjusted without introducing major changes to fit
other configurations as well.
Isolating User Processes. To physically isolate individual user
processes, we suggest a more flexible partitioning policy, i.e.,
not requiring user space pages to be confined to a certain
part of DRAM. Instead, we propose to check process pages
for conflicting security domains dynamically. For instance,
the kernel could prevent the physical memory allocator from
assigning a page to a process, which contains neighboring
memory cells in the rows directly above or below, that already
belong to another process. In case such a memory constellation
is detected, the buddy allocator would deny handing out the
page, otherwise it would be allowed to assign the page to the
requesting process. While this partitioning policy is much more
fine-grained than the policy we adopt for isolating the kernel
from processes, our implemented mechanism supports such
a strategy in principle. However, implementing this policy is
more complex than maintaining a fixed boundary between two
domains, since we also need to calculate the channel, rank, and
bank index for each page frame in this case. Hence, an imple-
mentation of a process-isolation policy is more specific to the
individual hardware setup and would require several different
implementations to support additional hardware configurations.
4This is usually at 1MB, although Kernel Address Space Layout Random-
ization (KASLR) may slightly modify this address according to a limited
offset.
5The default values for DDR3 on x86 are 4K for the page size, 2 pages
per row, 8 banks per rank, 2 ranks per DIMM and between 1 one 4 DIMMs
per machine. For DDR4 the number of banks per rank was doubled. DDR4 is
supported on x86 starting with Intel’s Skylake and AMD’s Zen architecture.
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CPU RAM
System Operating System System Model Version Cores Speed Size Speed Manufacturer Part number
S1 Ubuntu 14.04.4 LTS Dell OptiPlex 7010 0KRC95 i5-3570 4 3.40GHz 2x2GB 1333 MHz Hynix Hyundai HMT325U6BFR8C-H9
1x4GB 1333 MHz Corsair CMV4GX3M1A1600C11
S2 Debian 8.2 Dell OptiPlex 990 i7-2600 4 3.4GHz 2x4GB 1333 MHz Samsung M378B5273DH0-CH9
S3 Kali Linux 2.0 Lenovo ThinkPad x220 i5-2520M 4 2.5GHz 2x4GB 1333 MHz Samsung M471B5273DH0-CH9
Table I: Technical specifications of the vulnerable systems used for our evaluation.
Rowhammer test Rowhammer Exploit
avg. # reprod. victim pages Success (avg. # of tries)
Mitigation None B-CATT None B-CATT G-CATT
S1 133 0 3(11) 7(4001) 7(3821)
S2 31 0 3(42) 7(2897) 7(3096)
S3 23 0 3(53) 7(3513) 7(3768)
Table II: Results of our security evaluation. We found that
B-CATT and G-CATT can mitigate rowhammer attacks. We
executed the rowhammer test on each system three times and
averaged the amount of bit flips.
VI. SECURITY EVALUATION
The main goal of our software-based defenses is to pro-
tect legacy systems from rowhammer attacks. We tested the
effectiveness of B-CATT and G-CATT on diverse hardware
configurations. Among these, we identified three hardware
configurations, where we observed many reproducible bit flips.
Table I lists the exact configurations of the three platforms we
use for our evaluation. Our effectiveness evaluation of B-CATT
and G-CATT is based on two attack scenarios. For the first
scenario we systematically search for reproducible bit flips
based on a tool published by Gruss et al.6 Our second attack
scenario leverages a real-world rowhammer exploit7 published
by Google’s Project Zero. We compared the outcome of both
attacks on our vulnerable systems before and after applying
B/G-CATT. As shown in Table II, both tests only succeed
when our protections are not in place. Next, we elaborate on
the two attack scenarios and their mitigation in more detail.
A. Rowhammer Testing Tool
We use a slightly modified version of the double-sided
rowhammering tool, which is based on the original test by
Google’s Project Zero [21]. Specifically, we extended the tool
to also report the aggressor physical addresses, and adjusted
the default size of the fraction of physical memory that is
allocated. The tool scans the system memory for memory cells
that are vulnerable to the rowhammer attack. To provide com-
prehensive results, the tool needs to scan the entire memory
of the system. However, investigating the entire memory is
hard to achieve in practice since some parts of memory are
always allocated by other system components. These parts are
therefore not available to the testing tool, i.e., memory reserved
by operating system. To achieve maximum coverage, the
6 https://github.com/IAIK/rowhammerjs/tree/master/native
7 https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=283
tool allocates a huge fraction of the available memory areas.
However, due to the lazy allocation of Linux the allocated
memory is initially not mapped to physical memory. Hence,
each mapped virtual page is accessed at least once, to ensure
that the kernel assigns physical pages. Because user space
only has access to the virtual addresses of these mappings,
the tool exploits the /proc/pagemap kernel interface to
retrieve the physical addresses. As a result, most of the systems
physical memory is allocated to the rowhammering tool. We
also discuss on how we achieve almost full coverage in
Section VIII-C.
Afterwards, the tool analyzes the memory in order to
identify potential victim and aggressor pages in the physical
memory. As the test uses the double-sided rowhammering
approach two aggressor pages must be identified for every
potential victim page. Next, all potential victim pages are
challenged for vulnerable bit flips. For this, the potential victim
page is initialized with a fixed bit pattern and “hammered” by
accessing and flushing the two associated aggressor pages. This
ensures that all of the accesses activate a row in the respective
DRAM module. This process is repeated 106 times.8 Lastly,
the potential victim address can be checked for bit flips by
comparing its memory content with the fixed pattern bit. The
test outputs a list of addresses for which bit flips have been
observed, i.e., a list of victim addresses.
1) Preliminary Tests for Vulnerable Systems: Using the
rowhammering testing tool we evaluated our target systems.
In particular, we were interested in systems that yield re-
producible bit flips, as only those are relevant for practical
rowhammer attacks. This is because an attacker cannot force
the system to allocate page tables at a certain physical position
in RAM. In contrast, the attacker sprays the memory with page
tables to increase her chance of hitting the desired memory
location.
Hence, we configured the rowhammering tool to only
report memory addresses where bit flips can be triggered
repeatedly. We successively confirmed that this list indeed
yields reliable bit flips by individually triggering the reported
addresses and checking for bit flips within an interval of 10
seconds. Additionally, we tested the bit flips across reboots
through random sampling.
The three systems mentioned in Table I are highly suscep-
tible to reproducible bit flips. Executing the rowhammer test
on these three times and rebooting the system after each test
run, we found 133 pages with exploitable bit flips for S1, 31
pages for S2, and 23 pages for S3.
8This value is the hardcoded default value. Prior research [12, 13] reported
similar numbers.
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2) B-CATT: We installed B-CATT on our three test systems
S1 – S3. For each system, we blacklisted the vulnerable
physical pages collected in the previous step. We first verified
that the list of vulnerable memory pages was correctly reported
to the operating system. B-CATT adds vulnerable pages as
reserved regions to the e820 map (cf. Section V). Hence,
these pages need to be listed in the e820 map used by the
OS.
Next, we executed the rowhammer test on the evaluation
systems to verify that it can no longer find vulnerable memory
addresses. We executed the test three times on each system to
yield a reasonable coverage. For all test runs, the rowhammer
test failed with an error message when trying to allocate the
physical addresses that belongs to a blacklisted page. As such,
all attempts of bit flips on vulnerable pages are prevented
by B-CATT. Thus, B-CATT prevents all previously presented
rowhammer attacks [4, 7, 18, 21].
3) G-CATT: To install G-CATT, we patched the Linux
kernel of each system to use our modified memory allocator.
Recall that G-CATT does not aim to prevent bit flips but
rather constrain them to a security domain. Hence, executing
the rowhammer test on G-CATT-hardened systems still locates
vulnerable pages. However, in the following, we demonstrate
based on a real-world exploit that the vulnerable pages are not
exploitable.
B. Real-world Rowhammer Exploit
To further demonstrate the effectiveness of our mitigations,
we tested B-CATT and G-CATT against a real-world rowham-
mer exploit. The goal of the exploit is to escalate the privileges
of the attacker to kernel privileges (i.e., gain root access). To
do so, the exploit leverages rowhammer to manipulate the page
tables. Specifically, it aims to manipulate the access permission
bits for kernel memory, i.e., reconfigure its access permission
policy.9
To launch the exploit, two conditions need to be satisfied:
(1) a page table entry must be present in a vulnerable row,
and (2) the enclosing aggressor pages must be allocated in
attacker-controlled memory.
Since both conditions are not directly controllable by the
attacker, the attack proceeds as follows: the attacker allocates
large memory areas. As a result, the operating system needs
to create large page tables to maintain the newly allocated
memory. This in turn increases the probability to satisfy the
aforementioned conditions, i.e., a page table entry will even-
tually be allocated to a victim page. Due to vast allocation of
memory, the attacker also increases her chances that aggressor
pages are co-located to the victim page.
Once the preconditions are satisfied, the attacker launches
the rowhammer attack to induce a bit flip in victim page.
Specifically, the bit flip modifies the page table entry such
that a subtree of the paging hierarchy is under the attacker’s
control. Lastly, the attacker modifies the kernel structure that
holds the attacker-controlled user process privileges to elevate
9A second option is to manipulate page table entries in such a way that they
point to attacker controlled memory thereby allowing the attacker to install
new arbitrary memory mappings. The details of this attack option are described
in [21].
her privileges to the superuser root. Since the exploit is
probabilistic, it only succeeds in five out of hundred runs.
Nevertheless, a single successful run allows the attacker to
compromise of the entire system.
1) B-CATT: As B-CATT prevents any rowhammer induced
bit flips on a system, it also prevents this exploit. As vulnerable
memory pages are not available anymore, the attacker does not
succeed in allocating page table entries on vulnerable pages.
Hence, the attacker cannot manipulate the kernel’s page tables.
2) G-CATT: Our generic defense mechanism does not
prevent the occurrence of bit flips on a system. Hence, we have
to verify that bit flips cannot affect data of another security
domain. Rowhammer exploits rely on the fact that such a cross
domain bit flip is possible, i.e., in the case of our exploit it
aims to induce a bit flip in the kernel’s page table entries.
However, since the exploit by itself is probabilistic, an
unsuccessful attempt does not imply the effectiveness of
G-CATT. As described above, the success rate of the attack is
about 5%. After deploying G-CATT on our test systems we
repeatedly executed the exploit to minimize the probability of
the exploit failing due to the random memory layout rather than
due to our protection mechanism. We automated the process of
continuously executing the exploit and ran this test for 48h, on
all three test systems. In this time frame. the exploit made on
average 3500 attempts of which on average 175 should have
succeeded. However, with G-CATT, none of the attempts was
successful. Hence, as expected, G-CATT effectively prevents
rowhammer-based exploits.
As we have demonstrated, G-CATT successfully prevents
the original attack developed on x86 by physically isolating
pages belonging to the kernel from the user-space domain.
In addition to that, the authors of the Drammer exploit [24]
confirm that G-CATT prevents their exploit on ARM. The
reason is, that they follow the same strategy as in the original
kernel exploit developed by Project Zero, i.e., corrupting
page table entries in the kernel from neighboring pages in
user space. Hence, G-CATT effectively prevents rowhammer
exploits on ARM-based mobile platforms as well.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
One of our main goals is practicability, i.e., inducing
negligible performance overhead. To demonstrate practicability
of our two defenses, we thoroughly evaluated the performance
and stability impact of B-CATT and G-CATT on different
benchmark and testing suites. In particular, we used the SPEC
CPU2006 benchmark suite [8] to measure the impact on
CPU-intensive applications, LMBench3 [15] for measuring
the overhead of system operations, and the Phoronix test
suite [17] to measure the overhead for common applications.
We use the Linux Test Project, which aims at stress testing
the Linux kernel, to evaluate the stability of our test system
after deploying B-CATT and G-CATT. We performed all of
our performance evaluation on system S2 (cf. Table I).
A. Run-time Overhead
Table III summarizes the results of our performance bench-
marks. In general, the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks measure
the impact of system modifications on CPU intensive applica-
tions. Since our mitigations mainly affect the physical memory
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SPEC2006 B-CATT G-CATT
perlbench -1.79% 0.29%
bzip2 -1.81% 0.00%
gcc 0.00% -0.71%
mcf 0.00% -1.12%
gobmk -0.46% 0.00%
hmmer -1.12% 0.23%
sjeng -0.19% 0.19%
libquantum 0.88% -1.63%
h264ref 0.00% 0.00%
omnetpp -0.71% -0.28%
astar -1.40% -0.45%
xalan 0.00% -0.14%
milc 0.00% -1.79%
namd 0.40% -1.82%
dealll -1.63% 0.00%
soplex -0.19% 0.00%
povray -0.55% -0.46%
lbm 0.68% -1.12%
sphinx3 -0.28% -0.58%
Mean -0.43% -0.49%
Phoronix B-CATT G-CATT
IOZone 0.57% 0.05%
Unpack Kernel -0.30% -0.50%
PostMark -0.91% 0.92%
7-Zip -0.07% 1.18%
OpenSSL -0.19% -0.22%
PyBench -0.44% -0.59%
Apache 2.49% -0.21%
PHPBench 0.39% 0.35%
stream 0.13% 1.96%
ramspeed 0.00% 0.00%
cachebench 0.02% 0.05%
Mean 0.15% 0.27%
LMBench3 B-CATT G-CATT
Context Switching:
2p/0K -2.43% -2.44%
2p/16K -2.00% 0.00%
2p/64K 0.00% 2.00%
8p/16K -1.60% -1.73%
8p/64K -1.90% 0.00%
16p/16K -1.33% -1.33%
16p/64K -0.99% 0.99%
Mean -1.58% -0,36%
File & VM Latency:
0K File Create 2.08% 0.27%
0K File Delete 0.98% 0.89%
10K File Create 2.07% -0.35%
10K File Delete 0.51% 0.47%
Mmap Latency 0.60% -1.81%
Mean 1.13% -0,12%
Local Bandwidth:
Pipe 0.90% 0.18%
AF UNIX 0.31% -0.30%
File Reread 1.27% -0.38%
Mmap reread 0.00% 0.00%
Bcopy (libc) 0.04% 0.08%
Bcopy (hand) 0.67% 0.34%
Mem read 0.00% 0.00%
Mem write 0.94% 0.43%
Mean 0.51% 0.04%
Memory Latency:
L1 $ 0.00% 0.00%
L2 $ 0.00% 0.00%
Main mem -2.09% -2.09%
Rand mem 0.26% 1.66%
Mean -0.46% 0.11%
Table III: The benchmarking results for SPEC CPU2006,
Phoronix, and LMBench3 indicate that B-CATT and G-CATT
induce no measurable performance overhead. In some cases
we observed negative overhead, hence, performance improve-
ments. However, we attribute such results to measuring inac-
curacy.
management, we did not expect a major impact on these
benchmarks. However, since these benchmarks are widely used
and well established we included them in our evaluation. In
fact, we observe a minimal performance improvement for
B-CATT by 0.43% and G-CATT by 0.49% which we attribute
to measuring inaccuracy. Such results have been reported
before when executing a set of benchmarks for the same
system with the exact same configuration and settings. Hence,
we conclude that B/G-CATT does not incur any performance
penalty.
LMBench3 is comprised of a number of micro bench-
marks which target very specific performance parameters,
e.g., memory latency. For our evaluation, we focused on
micro benchmarks that are related to memory performance
and excluded networking benchmarks. Similar to the previous
benchmarks, the results fluctuate on average between −0.4%
and 0.11%. Hence, we conclude that both of our mitigations
have no measurable impact on specific memory operations.
System Blacklisted pages Total pages Overhead
S1 133 2, 097, 152 0.0063%
S2 31 2, 097, 152 0.0015%
S3 23 2, 097, 152 0.0011%
Table IV: Memory overhead for B-CATT.
Finally, we tested the impact of our modifications on the
Phoronix benchmarks. In particular, we selected a subset of
benchmarks10 that, on one hand, aim to measure memory
performance (IOZone and Stream), and, on the other hand, test
the performance of common server applications which usually
rely on good memory performance.
To summarize, our rigorous performance evaluation with
the help of different benchmarking suites did not yield any
measurable overhead. This makes B-CATT and G-CATT
highly practical mitigations against rowhammer attacks.
B. Memory Overhead
Both, B-CATT and G-CATT, prevent the operating system
from allocating certain physical memory.
For B-CATT the memory overhead depends on the indi-
vidual system, since all memory pages containing vulnerable
memory cells are blacklisted. As this list is specific per system,
we cannot make general statements. However, we evaluated the
memory overhead for our three test systems. Table IV lists the
number of blacklisted pages for our test systems S1 – S3: the
total memory pages available in the system and the fraction
of blacklisted pages from the overall memory. As shown, the
memory overhead of B-CATT is at most 0.0063% (<1MB) for
our test systems.
The memory overhead of G-CATT is constant and depends
solely on number of memory rows per bank. Per bank,
G-CATT omits one row to provide isolation between the
security domains. Hence, the memory overhead is 1/#rows
(#rows being rows per bank). While the number of rows per
bank is dependent on the system architecture, it is commonly
in the order of 215 rows per bank 11, i.e., the overhead is 2−15
=ˆ 0, 003%.
C. Robustness
Our mitigations restrict the operating systems access to
the physical memory. To ensure that this has no effect on the
overall stability, we performed numerous stress tests with the
help of the Linux Test Project (LTP) [14]. These tests are
designed to cause problems for the operating system. We first
run these tests on a vanilla Debian 8.2 installation to receive
a baseline for the evaluation of B-CATT and G-CATT. We
summarize our results in Table V, and report no deviations for
our mitigations compared to the baseline. Further, we also did
10The Phoronix benchmarking suite features a large number of tests which
cover different aspects of a system. By selecting a subset of the available tests
we do not intend to improve our performance evaluation. On the contrary,
we choose a subset of tests that is likely to yield measurable performance
overhead, and excluded tests which are unrelated to our modification, e.g.,
GPU or machine learning benchmarks.
11 https://lackingrhoticity.blogspot.de/2015/05/how- physical- addresses-
map-to-rows-and-banks.html
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Linux Test Project Vanilla B-CATT G-CATT
clone 3 3 3
ftruncate 3 3 3
prctl 3 3 3
ptrace 3 3 3
rename 3 3 3
sched_prio_max 3 3 3
sched_prio_min 3 3 3
mmstress 3 3 3
shmt 7 7 7
vhangup 7 7 7
ioctl 7 7 7
Table V: Result for individual stress tests from the Linux Test
Project.
not encounter any problems during the execution of the other
benchmarks. Thus, we conclude that B-CATT and G-CATT do
not affect the stability of the protected system.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Both of our prototype implementations target Linux-based
systems. Linux is open-source allowing us to implement our
defenses. Further, all publicly available rowhammer attacks
target this operating system. B-CATT already protects all
operating systems that can be loaded with the commodity
bootloader GRUB2. Further, G-CATT can be easily ported
to memory allocators deployed in other operating systems. In
this section, we discuss in detail the generality and coverage
aspects of our software-based defenses against rowhammer.
A. Generality Aspects of B-CATT
Extending the GRUB2 bootloader to blacklist vulnera-
ble memory allows us to protect all Linux-based systems,
OpenBSD, and Xen [26]. Xen is an open-source hypervisor
that is widely deployed on production systems. Similar to the
Linux kernel, Xen receives the list of available and reserved
memory through GRUB2. Hence, the current implementation
of B-CATT can defeat recently presented rowhammer attacks
in a cloud scenario [19, 27].
Unfortunately, GRUB2 is not capable of directly booting
Windows systems. Instead, in order to boot Windows, GRUB2
starts the native bootloader of the Windows installation. This
process is called chainloading. GRUB2 does not pass the list
of unavailable memory addresses to the Windows bootloader,
i.e., the Windows components discover the memory layout
by themselves. To make B-CATT available to Windows three
approaches are possible: (1) Microsoft extends its bootloader to
include the modifications we applied to GRUB2. (2) The BIOS
vendor adapts B-CATT and provides a modified e820 which
includes vulnerable memory. (3) GRUB2 hooks into the e820
BIOS interrupt allowing B-CATT to add vulnerable memory
when the Windows bootloader searches for usable memory.
In the current implementation of B-CATT we do not sup-
port UEFI. However, since UEFI provides a similar mechanism
to the e820 map, there are no obstacles to add support for
UEFI in B-CATT.
B. Generality Aspects of G-CATT
With our current implementation of G-CATT we focus
on isolating the user and kernel memory to prevent privilege
escalation attacks, because this is the most practical and single
publicly available attack vector. However, as described in
Section V-B2, we are currently looking into isolating memory
of user processes, i.e., assigning a security domain per process.
Although we are not aware of any cross-process rowhammer
attacks we anticipate to see such attacks in the future as an
alternative to kernel-based privilege escalation attacks. Further,
these attacks are conceptually similar to cross-VM attacks
which have been already demonstrated recently [19].
By isolating the physical memory of different processes,
G-CATT can stop such attacks (cf. Section V-B2). Similarly,
when implementing G-CATT in the hypervisor, physical mem-
ory of different virtual machines (VMs) can be isolated.
1) Fine-Grained In-Process Isolation: In fact, our design
also allows an fine-grained isolation within a process. Sepa-
ration within a single process has many security applications,
e.g., application sandboxes, or isolating attacker-controllable
data. As an example, in 2014, Microsoft improved the heap
allocator for Internet Explorer which separates the heap and
objects on the heap into two parts.12 As shown in Figure 5,
data objects in virtual memory are divided into meta data and
payload data. The payload data (Buffer1 and Buffer2) are
attacker-controlled data. The meta data (length and *ptr)
are usually isolated from the attacker. In the example from
Figure 5, the array object is comprised of a memory buffer
(Buffer2), a pointer to the buffer (Buffer *ptr) and
a field for the length (length). On a monolithic heap the
meta data (length and *ptr) would be adjacent with the
corresponding buffer (Buffer2). In this case, the attacker can
overwrite the meta data by overflowing Buffer2.
The separated heap, as shown in Figure 5, prevents this
attack, as an overflow in Buffer2 would only affect other
attacker-controlled data (e.g., Buffer1). However, the sepa-
ration of meta data and payload data exists only in the virtual
memory space. In the physical memory space meta data and
payload data can still be stored in adjacent locations: Figure 5
shows a possible mapping of the data into physical memory.
Given this setting, the attacker can modify the meta data
by leveraging rowhammer. By “hammering” Buffer1 and
Buffer2, she can launch a double-sided rowhammer attack.
As a result, she can modify data belonging to security domain
A by accessing data of security domain B [4, 7].
To prevent such attacks, the security domain isolation needs
to be expanded into the physical memory space. G-CATT
allows the creation of arbitrary security domains. However,
G-CATT is implemented in the kernel while the semantics of
the security domains (the separated heaps) are only known
to the application. Hence, to enable applications to have
isolation in the physical memory space this information must
be provided to the physical memory allocator in the kernel.
This can be achieved by extending the memory allocation
interface of the kernel (e.g., malloc) with an additional
parameter allowing an application to indicate which security
domain should be assigned to the newly allocated memory.
12https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-035.aspx
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Figure 5: Virtual memory isolation vs. physical memory iso-
lation.
2) Applying G-CATT to Mobile Systems: The rowhammer
attack is not limited to x86-based systems, but has been
recently shown to also affect the ARM platform [24]. The
ARM architecture is predominant in mobile systems, and used
in many smartphones and tablets. As G-CATT is not dependent
on any x86 specific properties, it can be easily adapted for
ARM based systems. We demonstrate this by applying our
extended physical memory allocator to the Android kernel
for Nexus devices in version 4.4. Since there are no major
deviations in the implementation of the physical page allocator
of the kernel between Android and stock Linux kernel, we did
not encounter any obstacles during the port.
C. Coverage of Rowhammer Testing Tool
B-CATT relies on the fact that all vulnerable memory pages
can be identified and blacklisted. In general, the problem of
discovering vulnerable bits is orthogonal to the enforcement
mechanism by B-CATT. For our prototype implementation
and evaluation, we use the rowhammer testing tool developed
and published by Google [6]. However, there are two factors
that impact the comprehensiveness of identifying vulnerable
bits: spatial coverage and temporal coverage. Since identifying
vulnerable memory is not required for G-CATT, we focus on
B-CATT for the following discussion on this aspect.
1) Spatial Coverage Aspects: The memory coverage of the
rowhammer testing tool is limited to the physical memory
it can access. Since the rowhammer testing tool executes as
an ordinary process on the system, it has no influence on
the physical memory assigned when allocating memory. In
particular, there are parts of physical memory which will never
be assigned to the rowhammer test tool, as some memory is
reserved by other systems entities, e.g., memory reserved by
the kernel. Figure 6 shows an abstract view of the memory as-
signment during multiple runs of the rowhammer testing tool.
Note that the kernel memory as well as the reserved memory
can never be assigned to a process. Hence, the rowhammer
testing tool can never test these regions for vulnerable bits.
Additionally, the rowhammer testing tool has to share the
system’s memory with other processes. Figure 6 shows that
the rowhammer testing tool cannot allocate all memory since
other processes (and other dynamic components like loadable
kernel modules – LKM) also require memory. However, since
these memory allocations are dynamic they can easily change
among reboots and runs. Figure 6 shows that the coverage
of the rowhammer testing tool for each individual run is
limited. However, the cumulative coverage of the rowhammer
testing tool achieves coverage of the entire process’ allocatable
memory. Lastly, even if the rowhammer testing tool cannot
detect all vulnerable memory bits, it still can detect all bits
that are exploitable from the attacker’s point of view, i.e.,
the attacker leverages the same techniques as the rowhammer
testing tool to detect vulnerable bits.
2) Temporal Coverage Aspects: Rowhammer is a novel
attack technique. To the best of our knowledge, there are
no studies on the system’s susceptibility to rowhammer over
a large time frame. However, one could easily imagine that
memory cells could wear-off over time and cells which have
been unaffected before become vulnerable. Since there is no
data available whether this can happen or at which rate cells
can become vulnerable, no definitive statements can be made
at the time of writing. In general, if cells become vulnerable
over time, the detection of vulnerable pages would need to be
repeated periodically for B-CATT. As mentioned before, these
updates can be fully automated to run without requiring user
interaction. Moreover, an attacker cannot simply utilize newly
appearing victim pages, but would have to repeat the memory
profiling for the targeted machine as well.
D. Single-sided Rowhammer Attacks
From our detailed description in Section V-A one can
easily follow that both of our proposed solutions can defeat
all known rowhammer attacks in general, and single-sided
rowhammer attacks [24] in particular. In contrast to double-
sided rowhammer attacks (see Figure 2), single-sided rowham-
mer attacks relax the adversary’s capabilities by requiring
that the attacker has control over only one row adjacent to
the victim memory row. However, as shown in Figure 3
B-CATT will prevent the system from allocating memory that
is vulnerable to rowhammer attacks. Hence, even if the system
contains memory that is vulnerable to single-sided rowhammer,
B-CATT ensures that this memory remains unused throughout
the entire run time of the system. As described in more detail
in Section V-A, G-CATT isolates different security domains
in the physical memory. In particular, it ensures that different
security domains are separated by at least one buffer row that
is never used by the system. This means that the single-sided
rowhammer adversary can only flip bits in own memory (that
it already controls), or flip bits in buffer rows.
E. Benchmarks Selection
We selected our benchmarks to be comparable to the
related literature. Moreover, we have done evaluations that
go beyond those in the existing work to provide additional
insight. Hereby, we considered different evaluation aspects:
We executed SPEC CPU2006 to verify that our changes
to the operating system impose no overhead of user-mode
applications. Further, SPEC CPU2006 is the most common
benchmark in the field of memory-corruption defenses, hence,
our solutions can be compared to the related work. LMBench3
is specifically designed to evaluate the performance of common
system operations, and used by the Linux kernel developers to
test whether changes to the kernel affect the performance. As
such LMBench3 includes many tests. For our evaluation we
included those benchmarks that perform memory operations
and are relevant for our defenses. Indeed we have also tested all
other memory-related benchmarks in LMBench3 and observed
12
Kernel System ReservedRowhammer TestProcesses / LKM
Rowhammer TestKernel System ReservedProcesses / LKM
Kernel Rowhammer Test System ReservedProcesses / LKM
Cumulative Rowhammer Test System ReservedKernel
1st Rowhammer Test
2nd Rowhammer Test
n-th Rowhammer Test
Cum. Rowhammer Test
System Memory
Figure 6: Memory allocations of rowhammer testing tools across reboots. Each individual run can test only a fraction of the
system memory. By combining repetitive tests the coverage can be maximized.
no measurable overhead (0.2%) as well. Finally, we selected a
number of common applications from the Phoronix test suite
as macro benchmarks, as well as the pts/memory tests which
are designed to measure the RAM and cache performance.
For all our benchmarks we did not observe any measurable
overhead (see Table III).
IX. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide an overview of existing rowham-
mer attack techniques, their evolution, and proposed defenses.
Thereafter, we discuss the shortcomings of existing work on
mitigating rowhammer attacks and compare them to our two
software-based defenses.
A. Rowhammer Attacks
Kim et al. [12] were the first to conduct experiments and
analyze the effect of bit flipping due to repeated memory reads.
They found that this vulnerability can be exploited on Intel and
AMD-based systems. Their results show that over 85% of the
analyzed DRAM modules are vulnerable. The authors high-
light the impact on memory isolation, but they do not provide
any practical attack. Seaborn and Dullien [21] published the
first practical rowhammer-based privilege-escalation attacks
using the x86 clflush instruction. In their first attack,
they use rowhammer to escape the Native Client (NaCl) [29]
sandbox. NaCl aims to safely execute native applications by
3rd-party developers in the browser. Using rowhammer mali-
cious developers can escape the sandbox, and achieve remote
code execution on the target system. With their second attack
Seaborn and Dullien utilize rowhammer to compromise the
kernel from an unprivileged user-mode application. Combined
with the first attack, the attacker can remotely compromise
the kernel without exploiting any software vulnerabilities. To
compromise the kernel, the attacker first fills the physical
memory with page-table entries by allocating a large amount
of memory. Next, the attacker uses rowhammer to flip a bit in
memory. Since the physical memory is filled with page-table
entries, there is a high probability that an individual page-
table entry is modified by the bit flip in a way that enables
the attacker to access other page-table entries, modify arbitrary
(kernel) memory, and eventually completely compromise the
system. Qiao and Seaborn [18] implemented a rowhammer
attack with the x86 movnti instruction. Since the memcpy
function of libc – which is linked to nearly all C programs –
utilizes the movnti instruction, the attacker can exploit
the rowhammer bug with code-reuse attack techniques [22].
Hence, the attacker is not required to inject her own code but
can reuse existing code to conduct the attack. Aweke et al. [3]
showed how to execute the rowhammer attack without using
any special instruction (e.g., clflush and movnti). The
authors use a specific memory-access pattern that forces the
CPU to evict certain cache sets in a fast and reliable way. They
also concluded that a higher refresh rate for the memory would
not stop rowhammer attacks. Gruss et al. [7] demonstrated
that rowhammer can be launched from JavaScript. Specifically,
they were able to launch an attack against the page tables in a
recent Firefox version. Similar to Seaborn and Dullien’s exploit
this attack is mitigated by G-CATT. Later, Bosman et al. [4]
extended this work by exploiting the memory deduplication
feature of Windows 10 to create counterfeit JavaScript objects,
and corrupting these objects through rowhammer to gain
arbitrary read/write access within the browser. In their follow-
up work, Razavi et al. [19] applied the same attack technique to
compromise cryptographic (private) keys of co-located virtual
machines. Concurrently, Xiao et al. [27] presented another
cross virtual machine attack where they use rowhammer to
manipulate page-table entries of Xen. Further, they presented a
methodology to automatically reverse engineer the relationship
between physical addresses and rows and banks. Indepen-
dently, Pessl et al. [16] also presented a methodology to reverse
engineer this relationship. Based on their findings, they demon-
strated cross-CPU rowhammer attacks, and practical attacks
on DDR4. Van der Veen et al. [24] recently demonstrated
how to adapt the rowhammer exploit to escalate privileges
in Android on smartphones. Since the authors use the same
exploitation strategy of Seaborn and Dullien, G-CATT can
successfully prevent this privilege escalation attack. While the
authors conclude that it is challenging to mitigate rowhammer
in software, we present two viable implementations that can
mitigate practical rowhammer attacks.
Note that all these attacks require memory belonging to
a higher-privileged domain (e.g., kernel) to be physically co-
located to memory that is under the attacker’s control. Since
our defenses prevent direct co-location, we mitigate these
rowhammer attacks.
B. Defenses Against Rowhammer
Kim et al. [12] present a number of possible mitigation
strategies. Most of their solutions involve changes to the hard-
ware, i.e., improved chips, refreshing rows more frequently,
or error-correcting code memory. However, these solutions are
not very practical: the production of improved chips requires
an improved design, and a new manufacturing process which
would be costly, and hence, is unlikely to be implemented. The
idea behind refreshing the rows more frequently (every 32ms
instead of 64ms) is that the attacker needs to hammer rows
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many times to destabilize an adjacent memory cell which even-
tually causes the bit flip. Hence, refreshing (stabilizing) rows
more frequently could prevent attacks because the attacker
would not have enough time to destabilize individual memory
cells. Nevertheless, Aweke et al. [3] were able to conduct a
rowhammer attack within 32ms. Therefore, a higher refresh
rate alone cannot be considered as an effective countermeasure
against rowhammer. Error-correcting code (ECC) memory is
able to detect and correct single-bit errors. As observed by
Kim et al. [12] rowhammer can induce multiple bit flips which
cannot be detected by ECC memory. Further, ECC memory
has an additional space overhead of around 12% and is more
expensive than usual DRAM, therefore it is rarely used.
Kim et al. [12] also suggest to disable faulty rows similar
to our B-CATT that we present in Section IV-A. However,
they provide no implementation and evaluation. In contrast,
we present the full implementation and evaluation of B-CATT.
While the authors concluded that this strategy is not practical,
we demonstrate that it is an efficient and practical solution
that effectively prevents rowhammer attacks as a short-term
solution. Kim et al. suggest to use probabilistic adjacent row
activation (PARA) to mitigate rowhammer attacks. As the
name suggests, reading from a row will trigger an activation
of adjacent rows with a low probability. During the attack, the
malicious rows are activated many times. Hence, with high
probability the victim row gets refreshed (stabilized) during
the attack. The main advantage of this approach is its low
performance overhead. However, it requires changes to the
memory controller. Thus, PARA is not suited to protect legacy
systems.
To the best of our knowledge Aweke et al. [3] proposed
the only other software-based mitigation against rowhammer.
Their mitigation, coined ANVIL, uses performance counters to
detect high cache-eviction rates which serves as an indicator
of rowhammer attacks [3]. However, this defense strategy has
three disadvantages: (1) it requires the CPU to feature perfor-
mance counters. In contrast, our defenses do not rely on any
special hardware features. (2) ANVIL’s worst case run-time
overhead for SPEC CPU2006 is 8%, whereas our worst case
overhead is 0.29% (see Table III). (3) ANVIL is a heuristic-
based approach. Hence, it naturally suffers from false positives
(although the FP rate is below 1% on average). In contrast, we
provide deterministic approaches that are guaranteed to stop
rowhammer attacks.
X. CONCLUSION
Rowhammer is a hardware fault, triggered by software,
allowing the attacker to flip bits in physical memory and
undermine CPU-enforced memory access control. Recently,
researchers have demonstrated the power and consequences of
rowhammer attacks by breaking the isolation between virtual
machines, user and kernel mode, and even enabling traditional
memory-corruption attacks in the browser.
In this paper we introduce two practical and effec-
tive defenses against rowhammer, B-CATT and G-CATT.
B-CATT extends the bootloader to blacklist vulnerable mem-
ory which completely prevents the attacker from inducing
bit flips through rowhammer. G-CATT, on the other hand,
is a generic mitigation that tolerates rowhammer attacks by
dividing the physical memory into security domains, and
limiting rowhammer-induced bit flips to the attacker-controlled
security domain.
Our detailed evaluation of B-CATT and G-CATT verifies
that both schemes prevent all known rowhammer attacks.
Further, our mitigation schemes do not affect the run-time
performance or the stability of the system.
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